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Abstract
We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer
surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of
the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of ρ-concavity
and ρ-convexity. The ￿more concave￿ is demand, the larger the share of producer
surplus in overall surplus, the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus,
and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus. Deadweight loss over
total potential surplus is at ￿rst increasing with demand concavity, then eventually
decreasing. The analysis is extended to asymmetric ￿rm costs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Imperfect competition distorts market allocations by raising the equilibrium price above
marginal cost because ￿rms have market power. The size of the distortion depends upon
the properties of the industry demand curve and the number of competing ￿r m sa sw e l la s
the assumed model of strategic ￿rm interaction. Our objective in this paper is to quantify
the extent of the distortion, according to various surplus benchmarks, as a function of the
number of competitors and the curvature of the demand curve for the pre-eminent case of
Cournot interaction. The analysis shows that the fraction of potential (￿rst-best) social
surplus captured by producers increases as demand becomes more concave. We also provide
bounds on consumer surplus and deadweight loss which are a function of (potentially) ob-
servable magnitudes, such as producer surplus. These bounds do not depend on a particular
speci￿cation of demand but rather on two parameters that measure the generalized concavity
and convexity of demand.
The paper complements three bodies of literature on imperfect competition. The ￿rst is
the literature that addresses market performance under imperfect competition, and traces
its lineage back through Mankiw and Whinston (1986), through Spence (1976) and Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), and ultimately to Chamberlin (1933). The emphasis in that literature
has been on the long-run free-entry equilibrium, with the issue being whether too many or
too few ￿rms enter the market. In that sense, the market performance measure used is the
number of ￿rms, though there has been no attempt to quantify the extent of the deadweight
loss. By contrast, our work can be viewed as a short-run analysis, with the number of ￿rms
￿xed. We consider the more fundamental issue of the size of the various surpluses reaped
(producer surplus and consumer surplus) and unreaped (deadweight loss) in the market.
The second literature concerns estimation of welfare loss due to market power, and goes
back to Harberger￿s (1954) provocative study that estimated monopoly deadweight loss as
0.1% of GNP. This famous study of distortionary ￿triangles￿ has been criticized in several
respects, including the use of the pro￿t data (for example, average pro￿t levels are used as a
benchmark to gauge ￿normal￿ pro￿ts), the assumption of linear demand, and the assumption
of unit elasticity of demand for all industries. Subsequent studies (also criticized heavily)
have used pro￿t and cost data diﬀerently, and typically have assumed linear demand or
2a constant elasticity. Cowling and Mueller (1978) have suggested that welfare loss could
be up to 14% of GNP. It is not our intention here to further investigate the use of pro￿t
data, but we do specify a consistent theoretical model that takes as its starting point the
equilibrium oligopoly pricing condition and uses it to then indicate bounds on deadweight
loss that depend on the curvature of demand.
The third complementary body of literature addresses equilibrium existence and unique-
ness in the Cournot model. Extended concavity concepts have been used to derive impor-
tant properties of the Cournot equilibrium. This literature traces its lineage back through
Novshek (1985) to McManus (1964). Most recently, Deneckere and Kovenock (1999) have
synthesized previous results and recast them in terms of properties of the direct demand.
Equilibrium existence and uniqueness are ensured if the reciprocal of demand is convex
(equivalently, demand is (−1)-concave). Extended concavity properties are also at the heart
of some questions on tax incidence under imperfect competition. As we elaborate in the text,
Seade (1987) has shown that a unit tax will be passed on by less than 100% (no tax over-
shifting) if demand is logconcave. This result is a comparative static property of the Cournot
equilibrium outcome. Similarly, ￿rm pro￿ts cannot increase with a unit tax if demand has
the weaker property of (−1)-concavity.1
The present analysis uses the general concept of ρ-concavity that was introduced into
economics by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991a) and applied to (Bertrand) oligopoly in Caplin and
Nalebuﬀ (1991b). This concept encompasses as special cases standard concavity (ρ =1 ) ,
logconcavity (ρ =0 )and (−1)-concavity where the reciprocal of the function is convex.
The larger is ρ, the ￿more concave￿ the demand function. In order to obtain a tighter
characterization of demand curvature we also use the parallel concept of ρ-convexity whereby
the lower ρ the ￿more convex￿ is demand.
Section 2 provides the intuition for the approach by deriving surplus bounds for a mo-
nopolist facing a concave demand. Section 3 presents a general background to the use of
ρ-concavity and ρ-convexity and delivers relations between functions and their inverses. Sec-
tion 4 constitutes the core of the paper. For n ￿rms in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly and an
observed equilibrium price, we ￿rst determine bounds on the actual demand curve given that
1Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) suggest that similar conclusions hold in a model of Bertrand
competition with product diﬀerentiation.
3it must lie between two curvature bounds. These bounds on the demand function then de-
termine the bounds on several surplus measures, such as consumer surplus, deadweight loss,
and the fraction of producer surplus in the total potential surplus (i.e., the perfectly com-
petitive benchmark level). In section 5, we extend the bounds analysis to Cournot oligopoly
with asymmetric costs. Section 6 concludes with some comments about the welfare costs of
excessive entry.
2A M o n o p o l y w i t h C o n c a v e D e m a n d
The basic idea can be illustrated simply for the case of concave demand. Consider a monop-
olist with constant marginal cost, c. Suppose that demand is given by D(p),w h e r eD is a
strictly decreasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function on some interval [0,p],a n d
is zero on [p,∞), and suppose that c<p. The monopoly producer surplus is
π =( p − c)D(p)







It is helpful to illustrate the solution on a diagram, where we break with Marshallian
tradition and ￿ip the price and quantity axes.2 From Figure 1 and (1), we see that the
tangent to the demand curve at pm reaches the line p = c at a (￿competitive￿) quantity level
of 2Qm where Qm = D(pm). Since the demand curve lies everywhere below the tangent line,
the deadweight loss (DWL) is less than half the monopoly producer surplus.
INSERT FIGURE 1.
A similar argument applies to consumer surplus, CS. The tangent to the demand curve
at pm reaches the price axis at 2pm −c i.e. pm − c above pm. Once more, the demand curve
lies below the tangent line, and the triangle below the tangent line has area (pm−c)D(pm)/2.
This means that consumer surplus is bounded above by half the monopoly gross producer
surplus, denoted πm.
2It is easy enough to work with the inverse demand function for the concavity analysis, but the later
ρ-concavity analysis is greatly facilitated by using the demand function.
4In summary, both DWL/πm and CS/πm are bounded above by one half when demand
is concave, with the linear demand case yielding the maximal ratio of 1/2.W h e nd e m a n di s
convex the two ratios both exceed one half, as is evident from the geometry of the problem.
As long as demand is not ￿too￿ convex, an interior solution still exists to the monopoly
problem. The bounds on surplus can be calculated using a generalization of the method
above. The rest of this paper elaborates upon this generalization and the corresponding
surplus bounds. We next describe the properties of the curvature restrictions.
3D e m a n d c u r v a t u r e
The degree of concavity of a function can be parameterized using the concept of ρ-concavity
as explained and applied in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991a and b). We also use the parallel
concept of ρ-convexity to parameterize the degree of convexity of a function. Although it is
n o tt r u et h a ta n ya r b i t r a r yfunction is both ρ0-concave and ρ”-convex (for some extended
real numbers ρ0 and ρ”), we shall show that this is true for any demand function. The key
features of a demand function that ensure that it can be characterized in this manner are
that it is strictly positive on the interior of its support and it is monotone.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider a strictly positive function ˜ D with a convex domain B ⊆ <+.
For ρ 6=0 , ˜ D is ρ-concave if, for all p0,p 1 ∈ B,
˜ D(pλ) ≥
h
(1 − λ) ˜ D(p0)
ρ + λ ˜ D(p1)
ρ
i1/ρ
, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (2)
where pλ =( 1− λ)p0 + λp1.F o rρ =0 , ˜ D is 0-concave if
ln ˜ D(pλ) ≥ (1 − λ)ln ˜ D(p0)+λln ˜ D(p1), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. (3)
A ρ-convex function is de￿ned analogously by reversing the inequalities in (2) and (3).
For ρ =1 , (2) is the standard de￿nition of a concave function. For ρ>0, (2) means
that ˜ Dρ is concave, while for ρ<0, (2) means that ˜ Dρ is convex. The 0-concave case (3) is
obtained by taking the limit as ρ tends to 0 of (2), and is termed logconcavity. The larger is
ρ, the more stringent the concavity restriction: if ˜ D is ρ-concave, it is also ρ0-concave for all
ρ0 <ρ .T os e et h i s ,c o n s i d e rρ>ρ 0 > 0.T h e ni f˜ Dρ is concave, any increasing and concave




is concave. A similar argument
applies for ρ<0, and it is readily shown that ˜ Dρ concave for ρ>0 implies ˜ D is logconcave,
and that logconcavity implies ˜ Dρ is convex for ρ<0. For example, a concave function
(ρ =1 ) is also a logconcave function (ρ =0 ), but not conversely. In turn, a logconcave
function is (−1)-concave, meaning that 1/ ˜ D is convex, and a ρ-concave function for any
ρ ∈ < is quasiconcave (which corresponds to (−∞)-concavity). In the sequel we shall refer
to one function as ￿more concave￿ than another when its ρ value is higher.
A similar taxonomy applies for ρ-convex functions. The case ρ =1 , is the standard
de￿nition of a convex function. If ρ>0,t h e n ˜ Dρ is convex, while for ρ<0, ˜ Dρ is concave.
Logconvexity corresponds to the 0-convex case. The smaller is ρ, the more stringent the
convexity restriction. Hence if ˜ D is ρ-convex, it is also ρ”-convex for all ρ” >ρ . A logconvex
function (ρ =0 ) is also a convex function (ρ =1 ) ,w h i c hi nt u r ni sa l s oaq u a s i c o n v e x
function (ρ = ∞).
Claim 1 Consider a strictly positive and decreasing function, D with a convex domain B ⊆
<+. There is a pair of values in the extended real line, ρ0 and ρ”,s u c ht h a tD is ρ0-concave
and ρ”-convex. If D is ρ0-concave and ρ”-convex, then ρ0 ≤ ρ”.
Proof.The ￿rst part follows since decreasing functions are both quasiconvex and quasi-




are linear, which is clearly impossible.
If ρ0 = ρ”,t h e nD is ρ-linear.F o rρ 6=0 , this means that we can write D(p)=( a−bp)1/ρ
for a−bp ≥ 0 and D =0otherwise, with b/ρ > 0 so that demand is positive and decreasing
on its support. The case a =0with ρ<0 is of interest because it corresponds to constant
elasticity of demand.3 This elasticity is η =1 /ρ < 0.F o r ρ =0 ,w ec a nw r i t ed e m a n da s
D(p)=ae−bp.T h e s e ρ-linear speci￿cations are useful in the interpretation of the bound
results below.
The ρ-concavity properties of D also imply restrictions on its inverse.
Proposition 1 Let D be strictly positive and decreasing on its (convex) domain, B.L e tP
3Constant elasticity of demand formulations have been applied to welfare loss calculations by Cowling
and Mueller (1978), Masson and Shanaan (1984), Daskin (1991), and others.
6be the inverse of D,w i t hP de￿ned over A which is the range of D. Assume both D and P
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Then
−
P”(Q)Q
P0(Q) ≤ (1 − ρ) iﬀ [1 − ρ](D0)2 − D”D ≥ 0 iﬀ D is ρ-concave.
Proof.If D is ρ-concave, then, by de￿nition, Dρ is convex for ρ<0, lnD is concave for
ρ =0 , and Dρ is concave for ρ>0. In each case, D0
D Dρ is decreasing, or
(ρ − 1)(D
0)
2 + D”D ≤ 0 (4)
Now, set D(p)=Q,s ot h a tD0(p)=1 /P0(Q) and D”(p)=−P”(Q)/[P 0(Q)]3.R e p l a c i n g
these expressions in condition (4) gives the condition P”(Q)Q +( 1− ρ)P 0(Q) ≤ 0.
We will explore the implications of this result in the context of Cournot competition in
the next section (and we justify the notation Dand P for the functions at that point). For
the present, we note one alternative possible application in another context. Suppose that
P is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with the consumer￿s wealth level as its
argument. Then the elasticity of the slope of P is the measure of relative risk aversion, and
so the proposition relates relative risk aversion to the curvature of the inverse of the utility
function. Thus the more risk averse the individual, the more convex the inverse of his/her
utility function.4 The proposition therefore shows that the concepts of ρ-concavity and ρ-
convexity are related to other standard measures in economics of a function￿s curvature.
We now return to the main case at hand, the application to surplus bounds under Cournot
equilibrium.
4 Cournot equilibrium with symmetric costs
The analysis in section 2 above is a special case of a more general formulation in two re-
spects. First, it is a monopoly analysis, and second, demand is concave. In this section we
generalize to Cournot equilibrium under symmetric costs and we also apply the generalized
characterization of the curvature of the demand function introduced in section 3 above. In
section 5 we shall further extend the analysis to asymmetric costs.
4For example, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is no greater than one if and only if the inverse
utility is logconcave.
74.1 Cournot equilibrium
Let there be n ￿rms producing a homogeneous product. Let demand be given by D(p),
where D is a strictly decreasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function on some
interval [0,p],a n di sz e r oo n[p,∞), and suppose that c<p. Further suppose that D0 < 0
on [0,p]. This latter assumption guarantees that the corresponding inverse demand, P(Q),
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,D(0)],w h e r eQ is total output.
For now, let marginal cost be constant at rate c (< p = P(0)) per unit and the same for
all n ￿rms. The individual ￿rm￿s pro￿t function is
πi =[ P(Q) − c]qi,i =1 ,...,n,
where qi is the individual ￿rm￿s output. In the subsequent analysis we relate the direct
demand curve to the inverse one to focus on the relevant ρ-curvature properties, but for now
we continue in the standard manner. Since P(0) >c ,n o￿rm will produce zero output in
equilibrium.5 The standard ￿rst-order condition for an interior solution is
P
0(Q)qi + P(Q) − c =0 ,i =1 ,...,n, (5)
so that qi is uniquely determined once Q is known, and is therefore the same for all ￿rms
(and equal to Q/n). Summing (5) over the n ￿rms gives
P
0(Q)Q + nP(Q)=nc. (6)
The left-hand side exceeds nc for Q =0 , and is strictly negative at the demand curve quantity
intercept, Q = D(0). Hence a solution, Qc, exists because the left-hand side is a continuous
function of Q. This solution is guaranteed to be unique if the left-hand side of (6) is strictly
decreasing in Q,s ot h a tas u ﬃcient condition for uniqueness is
P”(Q)Q +( n +1 ) P
0(Q) < 0. (7)
The second derivative of pro￿ti sP”(Q)qi +2 P0(Q).S i n c eqi ≤ Q, the following condition
guarantees that individual pro￿t is strictly concave6
P”(Q)Q +2 P
0(Q) < 0. (8)
5It can only be optimal for Firm i to produce zero if P(Q) ≤ c. But it would then be optimal for the
other ￿rms to produce zero too, which yields a contradiction since P(0) >c .
6The second-order condition, P”(Q)qi +2P0(Q) < 0, may only fail if P”(Q) > 0. But then, since qi ≤ Q,
(8) ensures it holds.
8It also implies that (7) holds for n ≥ 1.
The strict inequality in (8) is only needed for monopoly since under oligopoly all other
￿rms produce a strictly positive amount at any candidate equilibrium. Note too that (7) is
at its most stringent for monopoly, when it coincides with (8). Therefore both the existence
and the uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium solution (for any n ≥ 2) are guaranteed if
P”(Q)Q +2 P
0(Q) ≤ 0. (9)
and uniqueness holds under monopoly when the inequality is strict.7 Deneckere and Kovenock
(1999, Theorem 1) give condition (9) (with a strict inequality) as ￿the Cournot equilibrium
existence result with the least restrictive conditions on demand known to us.￿ From Propo-
sition 1 we have the counterpart to (9) as a condition on direct demand (see also Deneckere
and Kovenock, 1999): the (−1)-concavity of D ensures the existence and uniqueness of a
Cournot equilibrium.
It also ensures other properties of the Cournot equilibrium, in particular that a unit
tax cannot increase ￿rm pro￿ts. Seade (1987) noted that several key properties of Cournot
equilibrium depend on the size of the elasticity of the demand curve slope, E = −
P”(Q)Q
P0(Q) .
Speci￿cally, he showed that a unit tax would not increase pro￿ts if E ≥ 2. Writing out this
condition gives P”(Q)Q +2 P0(Q) ≤ 0, which is exactly condition (9) that was shown in
Proposition 1 to be equivalent to (−1)-concavity. Seade also showed that a unit tax will not
be overshifted (passed on by more than 100%)i fE ≥ 1. Writing out this condition gives
P”(Q)Q+P0(Q) ≤ 0, which is exactly the condition for D to be logconcave (see Proposition
1). It is noteworthy that this condition corresponds to industry demand sloping down no
faster than marginal revenue. Otherwise costs can be passed on more that one-for-one under
monopoly.8
We now follow through with the D-version of the Cournot equilibrium condition. From
(6), the Cournot equilibrium condition can be rewritten as P 0(Q)Q + n[P(Q) − c]=0 .I n
7Otherwise (if (9) holds with equality) it is possible that marginal revenue is ￿at over a range, and, if
marginal cost is at the exact same level, there is a corresponding range of outputs that maximize pro￿ts.
8Helpman and Krugman (1989) refer repeatedly to this condition (i.e., comparing the slope of demand
to that of marginal revenue) in their analysis of tariﬀs.






This latter version of the Cournot oligopoly pricing rule is important in the analysis below.
In the analysis that follows, we shall restrict ourselves to ρ0 > −1,a n dt h es i z eo ft h e
various surplus bounds will depend on the values of ρ0 and ρ” that bound the curvature of
the demand function. Hence it is useful to understand the implications of diﬀerent ρ values
in the Cournot model. Consider the eﬀects of an increase in the common marginal cost, c.













Since the denominator is positive by the assumption that D is (−1)-concave, the equilibrium
price necessarily rises. It rises by no more than the cost increase if and only if D/D0 has
a positive derivative. Thus a suﬃcient condition is that D/D0 is increasing, i.e., D(p) is
logconcave. Symmetrically, a cost increase will be passed on by more than 100% if demand
is strictly logconvex. Positive values of ρ0 might be expected for industries in which the latter
property is not empirically validated.11
4.2 Surplus bounds
We now derive the bounds on consumer surplus and deadweight loss. We ￿rst prove a
key proposition that restricts where the demand function may lie given that we know the
Cournot equilibrium price and the bounds on the curvature of the demand function ρ” ≥ ρ0.
For a given degree of concavity of demand, a tighter characterization may be obtained by
decreasing ρ00 whereas for a given degree of convexity of demand, a tighter characterization
may be obtained by increasing ρ0.





n,w h e r eη is






11Besley and Rosen (1998) ￿nd substantial tax overshifting for several commodities, including bananas,
bread, and shampoo. Poterba (1996) cannot reject full pass-on from post-war data, but suggests that
undershifting was more prevalent in pre-war times.












































which says simply that a concave function lies below its tangent line, and where pc is the
Cournot equilibrium price. Substituting in from the oligopoly equilibrium condition (10)











Notice that the same expression applies for ρ0 < 0 (since the inequality in (11) is reversed but
then raising both sides to the power 1/ρ0 < 0 then again reverses the inequality). Moreover,











The lower bounds involving ρ” follow from similar arguments with the inequalities reversed.
The proposition ￿rst uses the restriction that the demand function must lie between two
ρ−linear functions. Given an equilibrium price and industry output, there is an in￿nite set of
ρ−linear functions that go through this point and that could be used to bound demand. The
oligopoly ￿rst-order condition ties down the parameters of the bounding ρ−linear demand
function as the tangent to demand at the equilibrium point.
We can now use this result to derive the various surplus bounds. In what follows, PS




CS denotes consumer surplus, and DWL stands for deadweight loss.

























.F o rρ0 > 0, the expression on the right of this inequality has




(pc−c) =0 .F o rρ0 < 0, this expression goes to zero as p




























For ρ0 > 0, the anti-derivative term is zero at p = α by de￿nition, while for ρ0 ∈ (−1,0),t h e

















Analogous arguments with reversed inequalities yield the lower bound.
The proposition generalizes the monopoly analysis of section 2 to oligopoly. With a
concave demand, ρ0 =1and consumer surplus is at most a fraction n/2 of producer surplus.
It reaches this upper bound for a linear function, ρ0 = ρ00 =1 .T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a tu n d e r
linear demand with unit price and quantity intercepts and with zero marginal cost, Cournot











12The bounds in the proposition may be used to infer how the concavity of demand aﬀects
the ratio of producer surplus to consumer surplus. If we restrict attention to ρ-linear func-
tions, they are immediately comparable in terms of concavity, and a more concave function
(larger ρ) will result in a lower ratio of consumer surplus to producer surplus. The argument
can be extended to functions that are not ρ-linear in the following manner. Consider a ρ-
convex demand function, and compare to another demand function suﬃciently more concave
that it is ρ-concave (for the same value of ρ). The proposition then tells us that the ratio of
consumer surplus to producer surplus is smaller for the more concave one. In this sense, con-
sumer surplus is a lower fraction of producer surplus the more concave the demand function.
The argument holds because the bounds are a decreasing function of ρ.12 Similar arguments
will apply in the discussion of our subsequent propositions. With the underlying justi￿cation
given above, we shall henceforth be able to just analyze the comparative static properties by
considering the behavior of the bound expressions with respect to the curvature parameter.
The proposition has interesting implications for the distribution of social surplus under
imperfect competition. With more ￿rms, we know that the equilibrium price is lower for
any (−1)-concave demand. Total producer surplus is then lower, while consumer surplus
is higher. The fraction of producer surplus in social surplus falls as competition intensi￿es.
The following corollary provides bounds on this fraction.
Corollary 1 Let D be ρ0-concave and ρ”-convex, with ρ” ≥ ρ0 > −1.T h e n
ρ0 +1








The bound expression is an increasing function of the concavity-convexity index ρ.T h i s
means that the producer share in social surplus is larger for more concave demand. The
intuition is best captured by looking at ρ-linear demands. A useful way to parameterize
ρ-linearity is13
D(p)=K[1 + ρ(a − bp)]
1/ρ for p ∈ [0,p] (15)
D(p)=0 for p ≥ p.
12If they were increasing, a higher concavity of demand would have the reverse impact
13This parameterization enables us to pick up loglinearity as a special case and it also rotates demands
through a particular point as we vary ρ.
13where p = 1
ρb(1 + ρa) for ρ>0 and p = ∞ otherwise. The parameter values are restricted
in the following manner in order for D to be a demand function: K>0,b > 0,a > 0
and 1+ρa ≥ 0. These conditions ensure that demand is positive and strictly decreasing
on [0,p], and that p ≥ 0 for ρ>0. Keeping K, a,a n db constant, we may generate a set
of ρ-linear functions for ρ ∈ [−1
a ,∞). An important property of this parameterization is
that all demand curves pass through the price-quantity pair (a
b,K), and, at this point, the
elasticity of demand is equal to −a, independently of the value of ρ. For any given n and
c, this property means that we can set a and b judiciously such that the equilibrium price
is always a






) are then also independent of demand curvature.
The appropriate choice of demand parameters to keep equilibrium price independent of
curvature is a = bc + 1






n and substituting in the parameter values given.
Since producer surplus remains unchanged, the behavior of its share in social surplus
depends on how consumer surplus varies with ρ. Given that price is held ￿xed at a
b,t h e
behavior of consumer surplus depends upon how demand changes with ρ for prices exceeding
a





1+x − ln(1 + x)
¤
where x = ρ(a − bp). This expression is zero when x =0 ,i n c r e a s i n g
for negative values of x, and decreasing for positive values. It is therefore always negative.
This means that consumer surplus falls as demand becomes more concave, and so the share
of producer surplus in total surplus rises. Intuitively, think of a demand curve that bows
in more when demand is more concave. This demand curve has been set up to always
go through the same point, which point also concurs with the price equilibrium. Clearly,
consumer surplus falls as demand becomes more bowed in.
Corollary 1 shows that the same ratio of producer surplus to social surplus results for a
given value of ρ no matter how we parameterize the ρ-linear demand. An similar result holds
for the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus. This ratio is one measure of the eﬃciency
of the market. If producer surplus were observable, then the dollar amount of deadweight
loss could be directly inferred if the demand were known to be ρ-linear. If instead the
demand curvature were known to lie between two values, the following proposition indicates
the bounds on the corresponding size of the deadweight loss.




























if neither ρ0 nor ρ” is zero. If one or the other is zero, the appropriate bound is
ne
1/n − n − 1.















































and the bound expression follows directly.14 Analogous arguments with the inequalities
reversed establish the lower bounds.
As a point of reference, if ρ0 =1(concave demand), then deadweight loss is at most equal
t oaf r a c t i o n 1
2n of industry pro￿ts. This bound is attained for linear demand.
Proposition 4 provides bounds on the deadweight loss as a fraction of producer surplus.
These bounds are clearly decreasing in the curvature parameter ρ. T os e et h i sn o t et h a tf o r
any two values ρ0 and ρ00 such that ρ0 <ρ 00, there exists a demand function which is both
ρ0-concave and ρ00-convex. (For example, a ρ-linear decreasing function with ρ ∈ (ρ0,ρ 00)).
The proposition implies that for any n the bound expression evaluated at ρ00 must be less
that the bound expression evaluated at ρ0.







ρ − n − 1.
15This comparative static property with respect to ρ tells us that the more concave demand,
the lower the fraction of deadweight loss to producer surplus. This property can be visualized
using the same device as we set out after the previous proposition. We can parameterize a
ρ-linear demand in such a way that both the producer surplus and the equilibrium price are
independent of ρ. Then, as we showed before, demand at any price (weakly) falls as demand
becomes more concave. This means that deadweight loss falls as ρ rises. Again, think of a
demand curve that is anchored at the equilibrium price-quantity pair and that moves inward
everywhere else.
O u rn e x tr e s u l tc o m b i n e st h e￿ndings of the previous two propositions. Let TS = DWL+
CS + PS denote total potential surplus available in the market. For ease of comparison,
we present the results in terms of the ratio of total surplus to producer surplus, bearing in
mind that we are interested in the inverse of this ratio, which tells us how much producers
are able to extract of the total gains available from trade. The results tell us how eﬀective
are producers in extracting surplus from the market. Clearly, the larger the number of
producers, the lower is the equilibrium price and total producer surplus. This means that
the ratio of total surplus to producer surplus increases with n, which is corroborated by the
bounds given in the proposition below.





















if neither ρ0 nor ρ” is zero. If one or the other is zero, the appropriate bound is ne1/n.
As a point of reference, the linear demand case gives TS/PS =( n +1) 2/2n. This yields
a ratio of 2 for monopoly, as expected.15
Since the expressions for the bounds is the sum of the expressions given in Propositions
3 and 4, they must be a decreasing function of the curvature parameter, ρ. The intuition
is once again to be seen from the parameterization (15) with the parameters set so as to
keep producer surplus and equilibrium price constant as ρ is varied. Increasing ρ tightens
the demand curve around its anchor price, and in the limit as ρ goes to in￿nity, it becomes
15The monopoly upper bound in general is (1 + ρ)1/ρ, which is decreasing in ρ.
16a rectangular (step) demand where consumers inelastically buy K units up to a price a
b.
This illustration underlies the fact that the limit of the upper bound in the proposition as
ρ0 goes to in￿nity is 1, and producers extract the full potential surplus. Indeed, the bound










ρ tends to 0 as ρ tends to in￿nity.
As was the case for the share of producer surplus in social surplus, the fraction of the
￿rst-best total surplus captured by producers is larger if demand is more concave.
The bounds provided by Proposition 4 may be useful in evaluating the value of dead-
weight loss when pro￿t measures are available. They are less useful if we wish to study how
market ineﬃciency is aﬀected by demand curvature. Standard welfare analysis would usually
relate deadweight loss to the total potential surplus that may be generated by the market.
Equivalently we may consider the ratio of the total potential surplus to the social surplus
generated by the market equilibrium. Using Corollary 1 and Proposition 5 we have
(n + ρ”)(ρ0 +1 )











(n + ρ0)(ρ00 +1 )








Note that the lower bound is increasing in ρ0 while the upper bound is increasing in ρ00,
corresponding to tighter and looser bounds respectively. Further insight can be gained by
considering ρ-linear functions for which ρ”=ρ0 = ρ. We can then determine the impact of
changing demand curvature on the relative deadweight loss, DWL
TS (the terminology follows Ti-











so that relative deadweight loss moves the same way as TS
PS+CS. For the special case of
isoelastic demands (see Tirole, 1998, Exercise 1.4), it can be readily shown that the more
elastic the demand, the larger the relative deadweight loss under monopoly (given an isoe-
lastic demand). In our setting, this translates to relative deadweight loss being increasing
for ρ ∈ (−1,0). Clearly though the deadweight loss disappears as we approach the limit of
rectangular demand of our earlier parameterization of ρ-linear demand, suggesting that an
17increase in ρ necessarily decreases relative deadweight loss for large values of ρ.16 The next
proposition clari￿es the behavior of relative deadweight loss as a function of ρ.









ρ is a quasiconcave func-
tion of ρ that is increasing for ρ ∈ (−1,0) and decreasing for ρ large enough.
Proof.See Appendix.
The intuition follows out earlier parameterization of ρ-linear demand, whereby we hold
producer surplus ￿xed as we increase ρ.F o r l o w ρ, consumer surplus is large relative to
deadweight loss, and bowing in the demand function reduces consumer surplus more than
it reduces deadweight loss. This increases relative deadweight loss. For high ρ,t h eo p p o s i t e
pattern constitutes the starting point (low consumer surplus and high deadweight loss). Then
bowing in the demand function reduces deadweight loss by more than it reduces consumer
surplus, causing relative deadweight loss to fall.
5 Surplus bounds for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly
Empirical studies need to deal with observed asymmetries in market shares, and Cournot-
based studies typically assume marginal costs diﬀer across ￿rms. We now turn to the Cournot
oligopoly equilibrium with diﬀerent costs, which generate asymmetric equilibrium market
shares. Label ￿rms so that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn and assume that all ￿rms are active in
equilibrium (cn <p c in equilibrium suﬃces). The standard ￿rst-order conditions are
P
0(Q)qi + P(Q)=ci i =1 ,...,n. (17)
Summing up these conditions and dividing by the number of ￿rms yields a modi￿cation of
(6):
P
0(Q)¯ q + P(Q)=¯ c. (18)
16As we pointed out before, as ρ tends to ∞, demand becomes rectangular and producers capture all the
potential social surplus in the market. Thus market ineﬃciency vanishes.
18where ¯ q = Q/n is average output and ¯ c = 1
n
Pn
i=1 ci is mean unit production cost. Equations
(17) and (18) imply the property
qi > ¯ q ⇔ ci < ¯ c. (19)
which is useful below: a ￿rm produces more than the average output if and only if its cost
is below the mean level. Using similar arguments as in the previous section, the average
relationship in (18) is also useful in deriving the generalization of (10), which yields the
following relation between mark-up over mean cost to the key demand/derivative ratio:
n(p




With this result in hand we can now parallel the previous analysis. First note that Proposi-
tion 2 is modi￿ed simply by replacing c by ¯ c.I ti sn o wu s e f u lb e l o wt od e ￿ne the ￿mean-cost￿
industry pro￿t MPS =( pc − ¯ c)Q which is the pro￿t that would be earned in the industry if
the same total output, Q, were produced, and each ￿rm had the same (mean) cost, ¯ c.C l e a r l y
total producer surplus, PS equals MPS if all ￿rms have the same cost. The extension of
Proposition 3 is straightforwardly shown simply by replacing c by ¯ c.










Our measure of deadweight loss is built on the benchmark of the cost of the most eﬃcient
￿rm (1).17 At the optimal allocation, this ￿rm should serve the whole market at unit cost,
c1. The deadweight loss at the equilibrium allocation is thus the lost consumer surplus
from having the equilibrium price pc exceed c1, from which we subtract producer surplus,
PS (which is the part of that lost surplus captured by ￿rms). Hence the deadweight loss
expression is as before except the lower limit on the integral is now c1 instead of c.

































17See also Daskin (1991).
19if neither ρ0 nor ρ” is zero. If one or the other is zero, the appropriate bound is
ne




























(pc − ¯ c)
¸1/ρ0
dp − PS.






























pc − ¯ c
¸
dp − PS.
The lower bounds are established with analogous arguments with the inequalities reversed.
The bounds in the proposition involve the output share of the largest ￿rm, and two
industry pro￿t variables, one actual (PS)a n do n ec o n s t r u c t e d( MPS) which are equal for
a symmetric Cournot equilibrium. We can derive upper surplus bounds solely in terms of ρ0
and (potentially) observable quantities, producer surplus, market share of the largest ￿rm,
and the number of ￿rms. This is facilitated by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n ￿rms producing at constant (but diﬀerent)
marginal cost. Then mean-cost producer surplus is no larger than the true producer surplus:
MPS ≤ PS.
20Proof.It suﬃces to show that D(pc)[pc − ¯ c] ≤
Pn
i=1[pc − ci]qi,o r
Pn
i=1 qi[¯ c − ci] ≥ 0.
Subtracting
Pn
i=1 ¯ q[¯ c−ci] (=0 ) from the L.H.S. of the last inequality yields
Pn
i=1[qi− ¯ q][¯ c−
ci] ≥ 0,w h i c hi sn e c e s s a r i l yt r u eb yp r o p e r t y( 19).
Given this Lemma, if we replace MPS by PS in the upper bounds of the previous two
propositions, we obtain the desired upper bounds on deadweight loss. Tighter bounds can
be derived if one has access to data on demand elasticity and ￿rms￿ revenues. These bounds
are given in the proof below, while the proposition gives looser bounds in terms of aggregate
revenues. Let TIR denote total industry revenues (pcQ), and recall η is the price elasticity
of demand.
Proposition 9 Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n ￿rms producing at constant (but dif-


































































Replacing these expressions, along with qi/Q = TRi/TIR in the upper bounds in Proposi-

















































which follows from application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality applied to the vectors
(1,...,1) and (TR 1,...,TR n).
6 Conclusions
We have presented a set of surplus bounds under Cournot competition. Diﬀerent surpluses
are important in diﬀerent contexts. In measuring monopoly deadweight loss, or the damage
in￿icted by market power, our results on bounds on deadweight loss as a fraction of industry
pro￿ts mean that losses can be inferred from observation of industry pro￿ts and tight demand
estimates.
Whether a monopoly ￿rm enters a market depends on its pro￿t. However, the socially
optimal entry decision depends on total surplus generated. When the two are close, a ￿rm￿s
incentives are aligned with the optimum. Thus, when demand is very concave (ρ0 is high),
we should expect close to optimal entry behavior, but for a very convex demand (ρ00 is low)
much of the surplus generated by a ￿rm remains uncaptured and so entry decisions may be
far from optimal.
These surplus comparisons are also important under oligopoly. An additional entrant
joins the market if it garners a positive pro￿t. The optimal decision depends on the in-
cremental total surplus. An extension of the present research is to quantify the severity in
welfare terms of the over-entry problem identi￿ed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986). For
example, does it become more or less severe as ρ0 increases or ρ00 decreases? For a monopoly,
private and social incentives become aligned when ρ0 is high enough, so that the question
22is whether this logic extends to oligopoly.18 The oligopoly case presents some caveats; in
particular, the business stealing eﬀect. When ρ0 is large (demand is very concave) then ￿rms
succeed in capturing almost all of the total surplus. An additional ￿rm will not reduce price
much and so its social value is small. Nevertheless, it may still earn substantial pro￿tb y
simply attracting customers from rival ￿rms. This suggests that overentry may indeed be a
serious problem for ρ0 large, even though the analysis for a ￿xed number of ￿rms suggests
that this case involves little deadweight loss. This discussion underscores the point that
merely considering the size of deadweight loss, while taking the number of ￿rms as ￿xed,
may overlook substantial ineﬃciencies. Therefore one must be very careful in interpreting
the welfare results for a ￿xed number of ￿rms.
In this paper we have used generalized characterizations of demand curvature taking ad-
vantage of the fact that a demand function is both ρ0-concave and ρ00convex on its support
for some ρ0 and ρ00 such that ρ0 ≤ ρ00. This property is due to the fact that demand is
both strictly positive and monotone. This methodology could be extended to study other
strictly positive and monotone functions whose curvature has important economic implica-
tions. Two examples are cost functions, for which curvature measures returns to scale, and
utility functions under risk where curvature measures risk aversion.
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257 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 6.









ρ,a n dw ew i s h
to determine the eﬀects of changing ρ on this expression. First take the logarithm of the
expression to yield:
















(n + ρ)(n + ρ +1 )
n







Except for possibly at ρ =0 , this expression has the sign of the term in curly brackets
(since ρ>−1 and n ≥ 1), so de￿ne this term as T(ρ),







which is a continuous function of ρ. S is increasing when T is positive, and decreasing when
T is negative. We shall show that T is ￿rst positive and then negative, so that S,a n d
therefore the bound expression, is quasiconcave. The structure of the remainder of the proof
is as follows. We ￿rst show that (i) T is negative for ρ large enough. We next show that
(ii) for n ≥ 2, T has a local minimum at ρ =0 , at which point T is zero. Finally, we show
in (iii) that the second derivative of T is decreasing in ρ for n ≥ 2,. Coupled with (ii), this
proves that T must be positive for ρ<0: if it were negative at some ρ<0 then it would
have to be concave at some point in order to later have a local minimum at ρ =0 , but this
contradicts (iii). Finally, from (i), T is negative for ρ large enough, but, from (ii) it has a
local minimum at ρ =0 . To become negative, it must turn from convex to concave, but by
(iii) it cannot become convex again after it has become negative for the ￿rst time, and so
t h e r ei sau n i q u ev a l u eo fρ>0 for which T crosses the line T =0 .T h ec a s en =1is also
￿lled in below.






≥ 2. From (22), T(ρ) ≤ ρ(n +2 ρ +
1) − 2(n + ρ)(n + ρ +1 )< 0.















,s oT 00(0) > 0 for n>1,s ot h a tT has a local
minimum at ρ =0 .I fn =1 ,t h e nT00(0) = 0,a n dT has an in￿ection point at ρ =0 .
(iii) T 000(ρ)= 1
(n+ρ)2 − 2
(n+ρ), which is negative (as desired) for n ≥ 2.
The case n =1needs a little more elaboration. T000(ρ) has the sign of −1 − 2ρ,s ot h a t
T 00 is increasing for ρ ∈ (−1,−1
2) and it is decreasing for ρ>−1





T 0(ρ)=∞,a n d lim
ρ→−1
T 00(ρ)=∞, T(ρ) is positive, increasing, and concave at ￿rst: it
then becomes convex before falling to 0 at ρ =0 , whereafter it is concave and so falling since
this is an in￿ection point. It is thus positive for ρ ∈ (−1,0) and negative for ρ>0.
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